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EVIDENCE-ADI SSIBILITY OF SPECIFIC ACTS OF
NEGLIGENCE
Generally evidence of the character of a party is not admissible
in civil cases unless character has been placed in issue.' In actions
which are brought against employers on the ground that they have
retained in their service an incompetent person and have knowledge
or notice of such incompetence, the character of such person becomes
a fact in issue and may be shown by proper evidence. It must be
noted that in such actions the evidence of character is concerned
only with the competence of an employee as affecting the liability
of his employer; those cases are not to be confused with situations
in which the character of a person is offered to show that because
he was negligent or prudent on previous occasions, he was probably
negligent or prudent in ths case. Evidence of character which is used
for the latter purpose is generally held to be not admissible.
After the negligence of the employee or other person has been
shown to be the proximate cause of the act m the case at hand, the
following question arises: In actions involving the general incompe-
tence of an employee or other person, may specific acts of prior
negligence be shown to prove (1) the fact of incompetence, and (2)
knowledge of the master of such incompetence?
Evidence of specific acts to prove incompetence will be consid-
ered first. One of the leading cases which involves the question is
Guedon v. Rooney. Briefly the facts were these: an automobile
owned by the defendant, R, and driven by W, crashed into an auto-
mobile in which the plaintiff was a passenger. In an action by the
plaintiff against R, the trial court excluded evidence of other specific
acts of recklessness on the part of the driver, but admitted evidence
of the general reputation of W The Supreme Court of Oregon indi-
cated that the evidence of specific acts should have been admitted,
and said:
"In cases in which it is sought to hold the owner
of an automobile liable on the theory that ins negligence
in llcnding a car to an incompetent driver was in fact
the cause of injury to the plaintiff, the better rule is to
require such incompetence of the driver to be shown
by specific acts of carelessness and recklessness com-
mitted by him."'
'Adams v. Elseffer, 132 Mich. 100, 92 N. W 772 (1902) I WiG-
MORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) see. 64-. -
I WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) sec. 80.
'I WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) sec. 199, Kentucky follows
the general rule. See Lexington Ry Co. v Herring, 29 Ky. Law Rep.
794, 796-797, 96 S. W 558, 560 (1906).
160 Ore. 621, 87 P 2d 209 (1939).
160 Ore, 621 at 87 P 2d at 218.
STUDENT NOTES AND COMMENTS
It was also pointed out that the lower court committed error in
admitting testimony as to the general reputation of the driver with-
out laying a sufficient foundation by proof of specific acts. The court
stated that evidence of prior acts was the better way to show the
fact of incompetence, but from its examination of the cases an even
stronger conclusion, such as that which follows, could also be ap-
plicable:
"In those cases the great weight of authority is to
the effect that proof of such incompetency or reckless-
ness must be made by evidence of specific acts of -negli-
gence on the part of the servant claimed to be incom-
petent, and not by the general reputation of such serv-
ant for recklessness or incompetency "o
The statemdnts in Guedon v. Rooney which are concerned with
the proof of incompetence of an employee by means of specific acts
are supported by a decision which the court cited, Young v. Fresno
Flume & Irrgation Co.: In that case it was held that in an action for
damages for the death of an employee which was caused by the neg-
ligence of a fellow servant, evidence of the reputation of the fellow
servant as to carelessness was admissible only to impute to the em-
ployer knowledge of a fact which was generally known, and was not
admissible until there had been proof of prior negligent acts which
would constitute a sufficient foundation for a finding of the fact of
incompetence of the fellow servant.'
Other cases may be helpful, not only to show that specific acts
of incompetence have been admitted by the courts, but to illustrate
the variety of situations which may arise. Evidence of the following
acts has been admitted: particular acts of negligence on the part of
the conductor of a tram;9 prior negligent acts of a street car motor-
' 160 Ore. 621 at - 87 P 2d at 217.
'24 Calif. App. 286, 141 Pac. 29 (1914)
8 It will be noted that a fellow servant was involved in the
Young case and that a third person, who was not an employee, sued
in Guedon v. Rooney. In cases which involve suits by a fellow ser-
vant against the employer on the ground that the latter has know-
mgly retained in his service an incompetent employee, the fellow
servant rule (which would bar recovery) does not apply. Coughlin
v. Arms Textile Co., 94 N. H. 57, 46 A. 2d 130 (1946). The reason
is that the basis of the action in cases such as Young v Fresno
Flume & Irrigation Co. is not respondeat superior but is the negli-
gence of the employer in retaining an incompetent servant when the
employer has noticed that the servant is incompetent. However, the
plaintiff has been allowed to plead both theories in the same action.
Department of Water and Power of Los Angeles v Anderson, 95
F 2d 577 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938) see Clark v Stewart, 126 Ohio St.
263, 185 N. E. 71, 73 (1933).
'The Pittsburgh, Fort Wayne and Chicago Ry. Co. v Ruby, 38
Ind. 294, 10 Am. Rep. 111 (1871). (This case contains one of the
best discussions of the problem that is to be found)
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man," the previous bursting of two similar pulleys winch were made
by the same employee;' the prior practice of a mail agent in throw-
ing a mail bag;' previous collisions by the defendant's son with two
buggies;' testimony that the defendant's son had four automobile
accidents in the preceding two years;" and prior negligent acts of the
driver of an automobile (in.an aetion against the owner) '
From an examination of these cases it may be said that in
actions against an employer or other person, the great weight of
authority is to the effect that evidence of previous specific acts is
admissible to show that an employee is incompetent.!' One of the
statements in Guedon v. Rooney would seem to indicate that evidence
of specific acts is the only way in which incompetence may be shown,
but other cases have allowed both specific acts and general reputa-
tion to be shown." A decided minority of courts have excluded evi-
dence of specific acts and have held that in actions against an em-
ployer on the ground that he employed or retained an incompetent
employee, character for incompetence must be proved by evidence
of general reputation alone.'
The second question which affects the liability of the employer
is whether he has knowledge, actual or constructive, of the incom-
petence of the employee. Although Guedon v. Rooney indicated that
evidence of specific acts was the sole or primary means of proving
the fact of incompetence, the court established the following rule
for the proof df knowledge on the part of the employer: "The car
owner's knowledge of the driver's incompetence may be shown
either by evidence that he in fact knew of such acts or by evidence
tending to show that the driver's incompetence was generally known
in the community "s it is uniformly held that the knowledge of the
employer may be shown by evidence of the general reputation of the
1 0 Robbins v. Lewiston, Augusta and Waterville St. Ry., 107 Me.
42, 77 Atl. 537 (1910)
" Wabash Screen Door Co. v Black, 126 Fed. 721 (C. C. A. 6th,
1903).
'Shaw v Chicago & G. T. Ry Co., 123 Mich., 629, 82 N. W 618
(1900).
'1Linville v Nissen, 162 N. C. 95, 77 S. E. 1096 (1913).
"Laney v Blackburn, 25 Ala. App. 248, 144 So. 126 (1932).
1 See Clark v Stewart, 126 Ohio St. 263, 185 N. E. 71, 74 (1933).
Pittsburgh Railways Co. v Thomas, 174 Fed. 591, 595 (C. C. A.
3d, 1909) The Pittsburgh, Port Wayne and Chicago Ry. Co. v Ruby,
38 Ind. 294, 318, 10 Am. Rep. 111, 117 (1871) Robbins v. Lewiston,
Augusta and Waterville St. Ry., 107 Me. 42, 77 Atl. 537 (1910), Park
v. New York Central & H. R. R. Co., 155 N. Y. 215, 49 N. E. 674
(1898).
7Metropolitan West Side Elev Ry Co. v. Fortin, 203 Ill. 454, 67
N. E. 977 (1903) Consolidated Coal Co. of St. Louis v. Semger, 179
Ill. 370, 53 N. E. 733 (1899).
"8 Hatt v. Nay 144 Mass. 186, 10 N. E. 807 (1887), Frazier v.
Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 38 Pa. St. 104, 80 Am. Dec. 467 (1860).
" 160 Ore. 621, 87 P 2d 209, 218 (1939).
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employee,' and the general rule is that specific acts are admissible
on this point.'
The requirement of knowledge of the employer is satisfied if he
actually knows, or should know through the exercise of reasonable
diligence, that the employee is incompetent.Y For example, in Lou-
isville, d- Nashville R. R. Co. v. Wyatt's Adm'r.. it was held that
the defendant company was liable for the death of a conductor which
was caused by an incompetent train crew when the conductor had
notified the yardmaster of the unfitness of the crew. And in Owens-
boro Undertaking d- Lvery Ass'n. v. Henderson,- in which a pedes-
trian sued the owner of a garage whose officials had rented an auto-
mobile to one Wimsatt, the Kentucky Court of Appeals said:
"Therefore, if as a matter of fact Wimsatt was in-
toxicated at the time of the hiring, and his condition
was apparent to a person of ordinary prudence, ap-
pellant's officials will be held to have had knowledge
thereof, even though they were assured by Wimsatt
that he had not been drinking."'
In other cases, however, in which the officials of the defendant
do not have an opportunity to observe the incompetent person as
they did in the Henderson case, the mere fact of incompetence is not
sufficient to charge the defendant with notice. Professor Wigmore
makes the following exception: "It would seem that where the act is
so flagrant that it would ordinarily be observed by or reported to
the employee's superior officer, no other evidence would be required
as a condition precedent to admission."' If the act or acts are not
flagrant, evidence other than that of incompetence alone should be
considered in determining the question of whether the employer or
other person had, or should have had, knowledge of the incompe-
tence of the employee or person whose act caused the injuryY
' II WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) sec 249.
2'Robbms v. Lewiston, Augusta and Waterville St. Ry., 107 Me.
42, 77 Atl. 537 (1910), Grube v. Missouri Pacific Railway Co., 98 Mo.
330, 11 S. W 736 (1889), II WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) sec.
250.
- First National Bank of Montgomery v. Chandler, 144 Ala. 286,
39 So. 822 (1905), see Mulhern v. Lehigh Val. Coal Co;, 28 Atl.
1087, 1088 (Pa. 1894)
'29 Ky Law. Rep. 427, 93 S.W 601 (1906).
-'273 Ky. 112, 115 S. W 2d 563 (1938)
Id. at 114, 115 S. W 2d at 564.
II WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) sec. 250.
- Ibzd. A case which is to the same effect as Roblin v Kansas,
St. J. and C. B. R. Co., 119 Mo. 476, 24 S. W 1011, 1013 (1894).
If knowledge of the employer or parent cannot be shown, the
fact that the servant or child was in fact incompetent will not render
the defendant employer (or other person) liable. Sanders v. Lakes,
270 Ky. 98, 109 S. W 2d 36 (1937), Brady v. B. & B. Ice Co., 242 Ky.
138, 45 S. W 2d 1051 (1931).
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It may be asked, is one act of which the employer has notice a
sufficient ground to render him negligent for retaining an incom-
petent employee? In Pittsburgh Railways Co. v. Thomas, it was said:
"A man perfectly competent in all respects for the
duty he undertakes to perform, may occasionally be
negligent, so that one or two specific acts of negligence
do not prove incompetence. It must be either shown that
the so-called negligent acts were the result of incom-
petence, or were of such a character and so constantly
committed as to constitute a habit of negligence, rend-
ering the servant unfit to be retained in his position,
for unfitness, as well as incompetency is a disqualifica-
tion for employment."'
And in another case, Baulec v. New York & Harlem R. R. Co., this
language is found: "Character is formed and qualities exhibited by
a series of acts, and not by a single act."' However, in Smith v.
Chicago, P & St. L. Ry. Co., the court said:
"The mere happening of an accident would not
ordinarily raise a presumption of incompetency but
the conduct of a person on a single occasion may be
entirely sufficient to demonstrate his unfitness, and,
after such an occurrence, to charge the employer with a
failure of duty in keeping him in the service."'
Thus it would seem that one or even more acts of the employee
which are known to the employer do not necessarily make the lat-
ter liable, but a malicious act or a flagrant breach of duty may be
sufficient to create liability No hard and fast rule can be established.
In conclusion it is submitted that in certain situations above
discussed and particularly in actions which are based upon the
negligence of a defendant who knowingly employs or retains in his
service an incompetent person wnose acts have caused the injury in
question, prior specific acts of negligence may be shown to prove
(1) the fact of the incompetence of the employee, and (2) if such
acts are flagrant, the knowledge of the employer of such incom-
petence. But without such knowledge, actual or constructive, the
employer cannot be held to be liable.
E. DURWARD WELDON
174 Fed. 591, 595 (C. C. A. 3d, 1909).
59 N. Y. 356, 364 (1874).
-0236 Ill. 369, 86 N. E. 150, 152 (1908).
